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AFTER WE'RE GONE?: A COMMENTARY
MICHAEL A. MIDDLETON*
Derrick Bell's After We're Gone: Prudent Speculations on
America in a Post-Racial Epoch reminds us in most provocative terms
of the precarious social position of minority group members in this
country. In a broader sense, it reminds us that throughout the history
of civilization people have suffered oppression at the hands of those in
positions of power, and that even our Constitution provides only limited
protection from such oppression. Professor Bell has placed before us a
basic question that must be dealt with by all who wish to resolve the
difficulties inherent in governing a free society. That question is one
with which the framers of our Constitution grappled and that baffles us
still. How does a society effectively govern itself and at the same time
guarantee equal liberty for all? More specifically, in the racial context
presented by The Chronicle of the Space Traders, when may govern-
ment act for the benefit of society in a manner that is detrimental to
some of its citizens because of their race?
The framers of our Constitution struck a balance between the
power of government and the liberty of individuals through the estab-
lishment of representative government and the exposition of several
fundamental rights held by citizens. This structure was designed to
provide security from the excesses of government and from the oppres-
sion of one segment of society by another. As James Madison put it in
The Federalist No. 51,
It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society
against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the soci-
ety against the injustice of the other part.... In a society under the
forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the
weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign as in a state of nature,
where the weaker individual is not secured against the violence of
the stronger; and as, in the latter state, even the stronger individuals
are prompted, by the uncertainty of their condition, to submit to a
government which may protect the weak as well as themselves; so, in
the former state, will the more powerful factions . . . be gradually
induced, by a like motive, to wish for a government which will pro-
tect all parties, the weaker as well as the more powerful.'
* Michael A. Middleton, Professor of Law, University of Missouri, Columbia,
School of Law.
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 323-25 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
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The framers were concerned over what Madison called the dan-
gers of a factious majority.' An arguably effective means for protecting
against this evil was, as Madison described, the "comprehending in the
society [of] so many separate descriptions of citizens as will render an
unjust combination of a majority of the whole very improbable, if not
impracticable." 3 But it was understood that Madison's argument for
the effectiveness of this approach only went so far as to suggest that
unjust combinations would be improbable or impracticable. The institu-
tional innovations catalogued by Alexander Hamilton were also consid-
ered to be essential to the protection of the minority from oppression by
the majority."
The framers and their contemporary commentators understood
that the purposes of our written Constitution included placing certain
fundamental values beyond the reach of the majority, and establishing
a governmental structure that would ensure that absolute power is not
concentrated in any branch of government, particularly that branch
which most directly represents the people. As Thomas Jefferson said,
"The tyranny of the legislatures is the most formidable dread at pre-
sent, and will be for long years. ... 5
But even at the time of the framing, the question whether the con-
stitutional structure and the nation's expansion were sufficient to avoid
the evil of majority tyranny was a subject of significant concern. In
discussing the threatened tyranny of the majority, Alexis deTocqueville
noted:
It has been asserted that a people can never entirely outstep the
boundaries of justice and of reason in those affairs which are more
peculiarly its own, and that consequently full power may fearlessly
be given to the majority by which it is represented. But this lan-
guage is that of a slave."
He went on, "If it be admitted that a man, possessing absolute power,
may misuse that power by wronging his adversaries, why should a ma-
jority not be liable to the same reproach?" 7 In expressing his fears for
the future of the American experiment, deTocqueville noted, "I am not
so much alarmed at the excessive liberty which reigns in that country
2. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 80 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
3. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 324 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
4. Those innovations include the separation of powers among the branches of
government, a system of checks and balances, and an independent judiciary. THE FED-
ERALIST No. 9. at 72 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
5. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (March 15, 1789), reprinted
in THE PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON 440 (M. Peterson ed. 1975).
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as at the very inadequate securities which exist against tyranny."8 Fi-
nally, the philosopher posited that, "If ever the free institutions of
America are destroyed, that event may :be attributed to the unlimited
authority of the majority ...."
DeTocqueville's concern was well-founded because it is now estab-
lished that sufficiently important governmental interests can justify a
limitation of even those basic liberties enumerated in the Constitution.
One need only examine the Supreme Court's handling of constitutional
challenges to governmental restrictions on individual liberty in first and
fourth amendment contexts to understand how individual liberties may
be routinely sacrificed to higher governmental needs. The very notion
that we are a nation of laws compels a recognition that our individual
liberties may be compromised for the general welfare. The understand-
ing that laws are nothing more than a reflection of the contemporary
will of the people, however, compels a recognition of the precarious
state in which minority groups exist in this country.
A further complication surrounding the circumstances under
which government may infringe upon the liberty of its citizens is the
question regarding the circumstances that justify such infringement on
a racial basis. It is indisputable that the framers of the Constitution did
not have black people in mind when they developed the delicate bal-
ance that was intended to protect citizens from the tyranny of the ma-
jority. Despite this fact, however, it is clear that the fourteenth amend-
ment was intended to afford blacks constitutional protection by
guaranteeing to them equal protection of the law. 10 The problem is that
no clear definition of the concept of equality exists in the Constitution
or in its history."
The concept of equality advanced by many who describe them-
selves as originalists can be summarized as neither requiring nor per-
mitting anything more than absolute "colorblindness," and is drawn
from Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson.2 This approach
takes the position that race may never be a legitimate consideration in
governmental decision-making no matter what the justification. The
prevailing view, however, asserts:
[W]e cannot ... let color blindness become myopia which masks the
reality that many 'created equal' have been treated within our life-
times as inferior both by the law and by their fellow citizens ...
[t]he assertion of human equality is closely associated with the pro-
8. Id. at 265.
9. Id. at 273.
10. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S.
303 (1879); The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
11. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, in EQUALITY AND PREFEREN-
TIAL TREATMENT 84, 85 (M. Cohen, T. Nagel & T. Scanlon eds. 1977).
12. 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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position that differences in color . . . are neither significant nor rele-
vant to the way in which persons should be treated. Nonetheless, the
position that such factors must be "constitutionally an irrelevance,"
summed up by the shorthand phrase "[ojur Constitution is color-
blind," has never been adopted by this Court as the proper meaning
of the Equal Protection Clause.13
Under this approach, the concept of equality turns on the justification
for the particular racial classification in question.
The Supreme Court's analysis of the legitimate uses of race in
governmental decision-making has generally been in the context of
race-conscious affirmative action programs intended to benefit members
of minority groups. Such programs have frequently been challenged by
members of majority groups who assert that their right to be treated as
equals has been infringed upon. The Court has consistently concluded
in this context that race-conscious action passes constitutional muster
when it is narrowly tailored to achieve compelling governmental inter-
ests and intrudes minimally upon the rights of innocent others. 4 This
approach to equal protection analysis is consistent with the Court's ma-
jority analysis of race-conscious negative action in Plessy v. Ferguson.'5
The significance of this approach is that it recognizes the reality that
race is a factor that affects the nature of human interaction. In recog-
nizing that fact, this approach allows race to be considered in govern-
mental decision-making in those situations where race is significant."l
The Court, then, has determined that a compelling governmental
interest can justify an infringement upon the interests of its citizens,
and the fact that citizens who are benefited or burdened by the in-
fringement are classifiable by racial characteristics does not render the
classification violative of the concept of equal protection. Our constitu-
tional solution to the difficulties inherent in harmonizing effective gov-
ernment with the concepts of liberty and equality is, in the final analy-
13. Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 355 (1978).
14. In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989), the Supreme
Court resolved the ongoing dispute over whether benign and invidious distinctions
should be subjected to different degrees of constitutional scrutiny in its holding that all
racial classifications were subject to strict scrutiny.
15. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). The major criticism of the analysis in Plessy is that the
majority found sufficiently compelling the public good that would be served by the
avoidance of civil disorder resulting from race mixing. The fact that this justification
was grounded in racial prejudice and white supremacy, it is argued, rendered it incon-
sistent with the notion that all citizens are to be treated as equals. The Croson major-
ity's decision to remove the distinction between benign and invidious racial classifica-
tions diminishes the legal significance of this criticism.
16. While such an approach allows for the "benign" use of race to achieve the
compelling governmental purpose of remedying the effects of past discrimination, it
also establishes a framework for the "invidious" use of race to achieve compelling gov-
ernmental purposes.
[Vol. 34:443
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sis, dependent upon a judicious balancing of interests.
Some may read, The Chronicle of the Space Traders as a clever
hypothetical like so many put forth in a law school class - one that
raises interesting questions that will never in reality need to be ad-
dressed. The Chronicle, in fact, asks a very basic question that is sorely
in need of an answer today - what happens when "We the People"
decide, on a racial basis, to sacrifice the rights of some of us to a higher
interest?
The first frightening reality to be recognized is that when the de-
termination to sacrifice the rights of some for the benefit of the group is
expressed through amendment of the Constitution, there is no recourse
for the oppressed minority. Had the constitutional convention of the
year 2000 passed an amendment declaring, "Every African-American
citizen is subject at the call of Congress to selection for special service
for periods necessary to protect domestic interests and international
need," there would be no question regarding the constitutional legiti-
macy of the trade. The majority would have made the determination to
eliminate all constitutional restraints on governmental power to allow
for the conscription of blacks to this national service.
When those excesses are expressed through legislation, our consti-
tutional system allows for judicial review and the possibility that courts
will strikedown such legislation. Our constitutional structure provides
a mechanism for limiting some excesses of power. The more immedi-
ately threatening question that The Chronicle raises for me is whether
our well-accepted balancing of interests approach to constitutional in-
terpretation raises the possibility that governmental interests such as
those satisfied by the Space Traders' offer may be found to justify, even
within existing constitutional constraints, the ultimate infringement
upon the most basic rights of blacks. Suppose that the constitutional
amendment actually passed in The Chronicle was instead a piece of
legislation passed by Congress.17 Assuming that it was viewed as a le-
gitimate exercise of legislative authority, the only question remaining
would be whether the conscription of citizens on a racial basis would
violate equal protection concepts. The history briefly recounted by Pro-
fessor Bell reminds us of the numerous situations in which rights held
sacred by our minority citizens have been sacrificed to some higher
17. Such legislation, calling citizens to service to protect domestic interests and
international needs, may be viewed as exceeding already well-established congressional
authority to compel military service under Art. I, § 8 of the Constitution. See Selective
Service Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918). On the other hand, it is not unthink-
able that the security of the nation would be viewed as sufficiently threatened by the
situation described in The Chronicle as to justify such congressional action. Professor
Bell avoids this dispute by effectuating the need to call citizens to this type of service
through constitutional amendment.
1990]
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governmental purpose.18 If the standard for justifying such distinctions
is that they can be made in order to achieve a compelling governmental
purpose, is there reason to believe that the ultimate solution proposed
in The Chronicle could not be constitutionally justified?
The answer depends on the approach to equal protection analysis
extant at the time of the crisis. Maintaining the pre-Croson distinction
between invidious and benign racial classifications would do nothing to
prevent a court from finding the invidious classification involved in the
space trade capable of surviving strict scrutiny. Where the governmen-
tal purpose served by the classification is sufficiently compelling, the
classification is permissible. The alternative approach to equal protec-
tion analysis proposed by the originalists - to prohibit any use of race
in governmental decision-making - would render the space trade vio-
lative of equal protection, but it would preclude government from ever
recognizing that race is a significant fact of life. Thus, the originalist
approach may be viewed by many as too limiting on government's au-
thority to act in compelling situations.
There is a compromise approach that would allow government the
flexibility to act on a racial basis in some circumstances, but would
restrict such activity in others. This approach would maintain the dis-
tinction between benign and invidious classifications, but would also
raise the level of analysis so as to subject the benign to strict scrutiny.
Invidious classifications would be subjected to some higher level of
scrutiny or would be prohibited completely. This compromise, however,
raises the very difficult question of whether a particular classification is
benign or invidious.
The reality is that neither of these alternative approaches is cur-
rent law. If we accept strict scrutiny as the standard for measuring the
government action in question, one can easily see how a court could
justify as constitutional the national response to the space trade offer.
One can only speculate whether "we" would in fact accept the deal,
but there seems little doubt that we could. Certainly the deal would
eliminate our environmental, energy, and financial concerns, and per-
haps more importantly for some, our "race problem." On the list of
compelling interests, these must all be at the top. Accepting the offer is
superficially a no-lose situation for the majority of Americans. On the
other hand, sacrificing the fundamental liberty of a large segment of
society is the antithesis of all that America stands for. Accepting the
18. Bell, After We're Gone: Prudent Speculations on America in a Post-Racial
Epoch, 34 St. Louis U.L J. 393, 393-97 (1990). See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1944) (holding that compulsory exclusion of people of Japanese ancestry
from their homes on the West Coast during World War 11 was constitutional due to
compelling governmental interests); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (court
upholding constitutionality of Louisiana statute requiring segregation of blacks making
use of public trains).
[Vol. 34:443
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trade would be an admission of the failure of the American dream - a
confession that the American experiment was largely a failure. But
such theoretical and idealistic arguments have little legal significance.
The Constitution does not guarantee that the American dream will be-
come reality for every member of society.
The only persuasive argument against acceptance of the deal, and
those like it, is one couched in terms to which the majority can relate
- an argument that appeals to the self-interest of the majority. The
undeniable fact is, as Professor Bell notes, that people generally act in
their own self-interest. The reality is that the majority must be made to
understand that the denial of fundamental liberties to blacks today
portends similar denials to others in the future. The majority must be
asked, as Professor Bell does, with blacks gone, who among you would
be next? How would Americans react when the next caravan of traders
arrived offering even more benefits in return for all Americans over the
age of ninety-five? All Americans who are physically disabled? All
Jewish, Catholic, or Protestant Americans? All women not of
childbearing age? All Americans who are unemployed or
unemployable?
This commentary ends with the admonition that opens Professor
Bell's After We're Gone. It is indeed time for us to "'Get Real' about
race and the persistence of racism in America." Under a system of
government in which decisions about the treatment of people are made
by a majority of the people there has always existed, and always will
exist, the danger of a tyrannical majority. Under such a system, the
minority's fate will necessarily be dependent upon the will of that ma-
jority. One can only hope that when given the opportunity to decide
upon the fate of African-Americans, "We the People" will have the
leadership to explain, and the foresight to understand and balance, all
significant concerns.
19901
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